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Civil Procedure
Henry G. McMahon*
PARTIES
Necessary and indispensable parties in Louisiana have been
regulated heretofore only by jurisprudential rules, which have
not always been as clear and as workable as might be desired.'
Thomas v. Southdown Sugars, Inc.2 illustrates the necessity for
definite rules requiring the joinder of an indispensable party.
The action was one brought by the administrator of a deceased
party who alleged that he was the holder and owner of a stock
certificate, and who prayed that the corporation be compelled
to transfer the shares represented thereby to plaintiff. The cor-
porate defendant alleged its willingness to transfer the stock to
the owner thereof, but resisted the action on the ground that the
stock certificate had neither been endorsed by its original owner,
nor was it accompanied by her power of attorney authorizing
such transfer. The evidence disclosed that the record owner of
the certificate had had the stock sold at auction to one Gottlieb,
to establish a loss thereon for income tax purposes; and the
plaintiff's intestate had testified, prior to his death, that Gott-
lieb was acting at the time as his agent in the purchase of the
stock. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the transfer,
and the corporate defendant appealed. The intermediate appel-
late court affirmed.3 While the case was pending in the Supreme
Court on the corporate defendant's application for a writ of re-
view, the heirs of Gottlieb intervened,4 and alleged their owner-
ship of the stock. Under the writ of review, the Supreme Court
reversed, held that no judgment could be rendered because of
*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. The subject is discussed in some detail in McMahon, The Joinder of Par-
tie8 in Louisiana, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 1 (1958).
2. 237 La. 245, 110 So.2d 738 (1959).
3. Thomas v. Southdown Sugars, 95 So.2d 721 (La. App. 1957).
4. "Intervention" in an appellate court is irregular. Following the general rule
of civil jurisdictions, our present procedure permits a third person who is not a
party to a suit to appeal from a judgment which affects him prejudicially. LA.
CODE OF PRACTICE art. 571 (1870). The proposed new code retains this rule, but
to permit a more precise statement thereof permits the third person to appeal when
"he could have intervened in the trial court." PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE art. 2086 (Louisiana State Law Institute, 1960).
Since the court must notice a lack of indispensable parties on its own motion,
the "intervention" in the Supreme Court here served the useful purpose of calling
the defect to the attention of the court.
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plaintiff's failure to join indispensable parties, and dismissed the
suit. In a per curiam opinion refusing to grant a rehearing, the
Supreme Court recognized its power to remand the case to per-
mit the joinder of the Gottlieb heirs and for further proceedings,
but held that under the facts and circumstances of the case the
dismissal was proper. These holdings of the Supreme Court ac-
cord with the rules which will be established when and if the
new procedural code is adopted.5
EXCEPTIONS
Novel and interesting points of law were presented in Orr v.
Walker.6 Plaintiff instituted'suit to annul an act of sale of im-
movable property to the named defendant, on the ground of the
fraud of the latter in acting as an interposed purchaser for the
other defendant, well knowing that plaintiff considered this
other defendant a most undesirable neighbor to whom he would
not have sold the property at any price. The trial court rendered
judgment annulling the sale, conditioned upon plaintiff's repay-
ment of the purchase price, and assessed all costs against the two
defendants. Plaintiff's demand for damages was rejected. The
intermediate court, without reviewing the case on its merits, sus-
tained the defendants' exceptions of no right and no cause of
action, and rejected the plaintiff's demands. 7 Its decision was
pitched on two grounds: (1) plaintiff had no right of action
since he had sustained no pecuniary loss and (2) an action does
not lie for alleged fraud consisting only of statements promis-
sory in nature. Under a writ of review, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the intermediate appellate court and
remanded the case to it for further proceedings. Under the basic
code provision dealing with the nullity of contracts because of
fraud,8 the alleged fraud of the defendants was actionable since
it resulted in inconvenience to the plaintiff, even though the lat-
ter had sustained no pecuniary loss through the sale. The second
contention of the intermediate appellate court was swept aside
through a holding that the representations of the named defend-
ant that he wished to purchase the property for his own use,
when he was conspiring with the other defendant to purchase
the property for the latter, was actionable.
5. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 641, 645, 646 (Louisiana
State Law Institute, 1960).
6. 236 La. 740, 109 So.2d 77 (1959).
7. Orr v. Walker, 104 So.2d 226 (La. App. 1958).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1847 (1870).
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In the only other case of importance involving the excep-
tions,0 the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant levee board,
and those acting under its authority, from interfering with
plaintiff's enjoyment of its batture rights along the Mississippi
River, and prayed for damages for the forced eviction of plain-
tiff from this batture. The land in question was situated in Jef-
ferson Parish, where the suit was brought. Plaintiff alleged that
defendant had authorized the use of this batture by the United
States Army Corps of Engineers as sites for excavating earth to
be used in repairing a portion of the levee along a non-navigable
canal leading to a navigable lake. The trial court sustained the
defendant's exception to the jurisdiction ratione personae, and
of no right and no cause of action, and dismissed the suit. The
first exception was grounded on the fact that defendant's domi-
cile was in St. James Parish; while the other exceptions were
based on the contention that the batture on plaintiff's land was
subject to a perpetual servitude for levee purposes. On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed the trial court on all points. Since
plaintiff's action was really one relating to trespass to real
estate, and further related to a real servitude, the venue was
held proper under one of the exceptions to the general rule of
suit at the domicile of the defendant.10 Whether the batture on
plaintiff's land was subject to a servitude for levee purposes on
a non-navigable canal leading to a navigable lake was held to
present mixed questions of law and fact which could not be dis-
posed of on the trial of the exceptions. The case was remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings.
THE INCIDENTAL DEMANDS
Reconventional Demand
Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc." came back to the Supreme
9. Geisenheimer Realty Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 237 La. 306, 111 So.2d
123 (1959).
11. LA. CODF OF PRACTICE art. 165 (8). The decision of the Supreme Court
on the exception to the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae is clearly cor-
rect; but there is some language in its opinion on this point which conceivably
could cause difficulty in the future. In referring to the term "trespass on real
estate" in Article 165 (8), the court says: "Palpably, the instant suit constitutes
an 'action in trespass,' a 'trespass' used in its generic and comprehensive sense
of committing an act which is wrongful, and in itself productive of injury. It is
not used in the technical sense of committing a trespass upon the property of
another." 237 La. at 311, 111 So.2d at 124. Article 165 (8) uses the term in its
strict and technical sense; Article 165 (9) uses it in its broad and generic sense.
Tripani v. Meraux, 184 La. 66, 76, 165 So. 453, 456 (1936) and cases cited therein.
11. 237 La. 132, 110 So.2d 553 (1959). The first Supreme Court decision is
[Vol. XX
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Court during the past term. The Supreme Court's decision on
the only procedural point involved is noteworthy: a trial judge,
on timely objection by the plaintiff, may exclude all evidence
tendered by the defendant to support a cause of action pleaded
in his reconventional demand and which is prescribed. This rul-
ing will relieve somewhat the difficulties caused by the present
rule precluding, as prohibited replicatory pleadings, an excep-
tion to a reconventional demand. The proposed new code solves
this problem completely, by permitting exceptions and requiring
answers to all incidental demands, and permitting the trial of
such exceptions in limine.
Intervention
In Emmco Insurance Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 2 the facts
were substantially as follows: As an aftermath of an intersec-
tional collision, the owner of one car, and his collision insurer as
partial subrogee, filed suit against the liability insurer of the
owner of the other car involved, to recover property damage.
The owner of the second car intervened, praying for damages for
physical injuries and to property against the individual plain-
tiff. The latter excepted to the intervention on the ground that
this claim was not the proper subject of an intervention. The
trial court originally rendered judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs and against the defendant, and dismissed the intervention.
On rehearing, however, the trial court reversed itself, dismissed
the plaintiffs' demand and rendered judgment for the intervener.
On the appeal of the individual plaintiff, complaining only of
the judgment in favor of intervener, the intermediate appellate
court reversed."' It held that the claim of the intervener was not
a proper subject of intervention, as it could not meet the test of
the rule that the dismissal of the main demand result in the dis-
missal of the intervention. Under a writ of review, the Supreme
Court reversed. The intervention was held valid under the basic
code articles on intervention.-4 It was pointed out that but for
the direct action statute, the intervener would have been an in-
dispensable party to the plaintiffs' suit. The same result as that
reported in 227 L. 127, 78 So.2d 534 (1955), and is discussed in The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-Civil Procedure, 16 Lou-
ISIANIA LAW REVImv 361, 369 (1956).
12. 237 Lu. 286, 111 So.2d 115 (1959), 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 165(1959).
13. Emmeo Insurance Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 105 So.2d 748 (La. App.
1958), 28 TuL. L. REV. 414 (1959).
14. LA. CODE OF I'RACTICE arts. 389, 390 (1870).
1960]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
reached by the Supreme Court would obtain under the broader
and more liberal rule enunciated in the proposed new code. 5
Demand Against Third Party
Two cases of importance in this area were decided by the
Supreme Court during the past term. In Succession of Franz6
the defendant, who as executor and universal legatee had success-
fully resisted an attack on the validity of the will of deceased,
was sued by four examiners of questioned documents to recover
the fees promised them for testifying as expert witnesses in the
will contest. Defendant sought to bring in, as third party de-
fendants, certain nonresidents who had unsuccessfully attacked
the will. These defendants excepted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, 1 7 and their exceptions were sustained. This ruling
was upheld on appeal. The Supreme Court held that by attack-
ing judicially the will of the deceased, these nonresidents had
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court in the will
contest case, and were subject to any judgment taxing costs, but
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the court in these separate
suits.
In the second of these cases, Cameron v. Reserve Insurance
Co.,'8 the Supreme Court rendered a decision which greatly re-
15. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF Civrr PROCEDURE art. 1091 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1960) reads as follows:
"A third person having an interest therein may intervene in a pending action
to enforce a right related to or connected with the object of the pending action
against one or more of the parties thereto by:
"(1) Joining with plaintiff in demanding the same or similar relief against
the defendant;
"(2) Uniting with defendant in resisting the plaintiff's demand; or
"(3) Opposing both plaintiff and defendant."
The present harsh and hypertechnical rule that an intervention falls with the
dismissal of the main demand would be abrogated by id. art. 1039.
For a more complete discussion of the principal case, the reader is referred
to the casenote cited supra note 12.
16. 236 La. 781, 109 So.2d 92 (1959).
17. The Supreme Court refers to this exception as a "plea to the jurisdiction
ratione personae." Id. at 785, 109 So.2d at 93. Actually the objection was to the
court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of these defendants-quite another
thing. The confusion of the present terms respecting jurisdiction is one of the
many reasons why the Louisiana State Law Institute is recommending suppres-
sion of the present terminology and acceptance of the Anglo-American terms juris-
diction, jurisdiction over subject matter, jurisdiction over the person, jurisdiction
over property, jurisdiction over status, and venue. Whether we like it or not these
Anglo-American concepts are a part of our procedural law as the result of the
constitutional requirements of full faith and credit and due process of law. The
change is recommended to avoid the confusion resulting from the necessity of hav-
ing two separate and distinct terminologies. See PROPOSED LA. CODE OF Cii
PRocEnuRE arts. 1-10 and Introduction, p. 2 (Louisiana State Law Institute,
1960).
18. 237 La. 433, 111 So.2d 36 (1958, on rehearing 1959), 20 LOUISIANA LAW
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duces the present efficacy of third party practice. There, on the
original hearing, it was held that a third party defendant domi-
ciled in a parish other than that where the main demand was
pending was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court ratione
personae, unless the case clearly fell within one of the exceptions
to the general rule of suit at the domicile of the defendant; and
that the Third Party Practice Act made no such exception. 1" It
is believed that this holding is erroneous, under a basic code
article2 O not called to the attention of or considered by the court.
At all events, this unfortunate holding will be overruled legisla-
tively when and if the new procedural code is adopted.21
A rehearing was granted to reconsider this ruling, but the
opinion rendered therein was devoted primarily to the question
of whether the third party defendant had waived his exception
to the jurisdiction ratione personae by filing his answer simul-
taneously therewith, but in the alternative and with full reserva-
tion of all of his rights under the exception. The court held that
there was no waiver of the exception. This is one of those pro-
cedural decisions which appears to be commendably liberal, but
which so clashes with analogous rules based on the same ra-
tionale that it leaves this area of our procedure confused and
unsettled.22 It is hoped that this confusion will be short-lived.
REviEW 432 (1960).
19. This is one of several hiatuses resulting from the failure of the Legisla-
ture in 1954 to adopt the general provisions in the proposed new code applicable
to all incidental demands, and its adoption of only those provisions relating to
the demand against a third party. On this point, see Automotive Finance Co. v.
Daigle, 80 So.2d 579 (La. App. 1955) ; and Survey of 1984 Legislation-Oourts
and Judicial Procedure, 15 LOUISIANA LAw REvIEW 38, 46-49 (1954).
20. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 154 (1870) provides that all incidental de-
mands are subject to the same jurisdiction as the suit itself. This point is dis-
cussed in greater detail in the note on the principal case, cited supra note 18.
21. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PaOcEDuRE art. 1034 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1960).
22. An elementary principle of procedure should determine all of these prob-
lems. Has the defendant after filing, but before the trial court has acted on, his ex-
ception to the jurisdiction ratione personae submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by filing other pleadings which he need not file then and which affirma-
tively invoke that jurisdiction. The amendment of LA. CODE OF PRAOTIOE
art. 333 by Acts 1936, No. 124 § 1, p. 386, requiring the filing at the same time
of all declinatory and dilatory exceptions, posed somewhat of a problem. This was
solved in State v. Younger, 206 La. 1037, 20 So.2d 305 (1944), 19 TuL. L. Rzv. 460
(1945), with the holding that a defendant could comply with the amended code
article by filing his declinatory and dilatory exceptions simultaneously, pleading
the dilatory only in the alternative. Heretofore, this has marked the limits of
permissible alternative pleading. Neither the Younger case, supra, nor Mann v.
Mann, 170 La. 958, 129 So. 543 (1930) support the court's position here. In the
Mann case, supra, the declinatory exception was to the jurisdiction ratione ma-
terine, which could not be waived impliedly, or even expressly for that matter.
Further, although the court is in no way responsible for this, the reporter has
1960]
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The proposed procedural code provides workable rules for all
facets of this problem.2 3
DISCONTINUANCE
The injustice to a defendant, put to all of the inconvenience
and expense of preparing for trial and actually trying the case,
resulting from the present code rule24 granting the plaintiff the
right to discontinue his suit at any time prior to rendition of
judgment,2 5 is high-lighted in Clark v. Cottage Builders, Inc. 28
The proposed new code follows the federal rule of permitting
the plaintiff to dismiss his suit at any time, but granting the
trial court the discretion to determine whether this dismissal is
to bewith or without prejudice.2 7
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT
Under the original Code of Practice, a judgment of another
court whether of Louisiana, another state, or a foreign coun-
try, could be enforced ex parte through executory process. 28 This
added to the confusion in its editorial headnotes. Syllabus No. 9 is flatly con-
tradicted by LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 333, as amended.
The prior decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject have been extremely
technical. The various declinatory exceptions themselves had to be filed in the
alternative, and in a sacred order; and one of a higher order was waived by
coupling it with one of a lower order. George W. Garig Transfer v. Harris, 226
La. 117, 75 So.2d 28 (1954), 15 LouisIANA LAW REviEw 849 (1955) ; Mitchell
v. Gulf States Finance Corp., 226 La. 1008, 78 So.2d 3 (1955). These hypertech-
nical results were thought to be required by inexorable logic. Procedural rules
which waste so much of the time and energies of the courts and attorneys on
such trivia are unworkable. The proposed new code adopts a much more sensible
approach.
23. The solution of all of these problems under the PaoPosED LA. CODE OF
CIvm PxocEDuRE (Louisiana State Law Institute, 1960) is much simpler and more
workable. The numerous nominate exceptions of our present law would be abol-
ished, and only three exceptions permitted: the declinatory exception, the dilatory
exception, and the peremptory exception. Art. 922. The various types of pro-
cedural objection which may be pleaded through each of these three exceptions
are spelled out. Arts. 925-927. "When two or more of these objections [the pres-
ent nominate declinatory exceptions] are pleaded in the declinatory exception,
they need not be pleaded in the alternative or in any particular order." Art. 925.
The declinatory and dilatory exceptions must be filed at the same time; but
"When filed at the same time or in the same pleading, these exceptions need not
be pleaded in the alternative or in a particular order." Art. 928. "When a de-
fendant makes an appearance, all objections which may be raised through the
declinatory exception, except the court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, are waived unless pleaded therein." Art. 925.
24. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 491 (1870).
25. The more recent cases have qualified the code rule by denying plaintiff
the right to discontinue when the defense "is in the nature of a reconventional
demand?', whatever that may mean. These cases are discussed in the principal
case, and in MOMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE (1939), Supplement 156 (1956).
26. 237 La. 157, 110 So. 562 (1959).
27. PRoposED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE art. 1671 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1960).
28. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts. 746 and 747 (1825).
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procedure was found unworkable for the enforcement of the
judgments of other states and foreign countries, so in 1846 the
code articles were amended, so as to limit executory procedure
to the enforcement of judgments of other Louisiana courts.2
This left this portion of our procedure without a positive law
basis, but the courts filled in this hiatus by developing juris-
prudential rules requiring suit on the foreign judgment in an
ordinary proceeding, with personal service of process upon the
defendant in Louisiana, and an opportunity for the defendant
to plead and prove the lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court.3°
These jurisprudential rules were applied in Henson v. Henson.s8
were an ex parte judgment of a Louisiana court recognizing the
judgment of a Kansas court, without service of process on the
defendant, was held void. An interesting off-shoot of the case
is the court's holding that the defendant did not submit to the
jurisdiction of the Louisiana court by appearing for an examina-
tion under the Judgment Debtor Examination Act, without ob-
jection or protest. The proposed new code will make no change
in either of the rulings of the court in this case.82
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
There was the usual quota of cases transferred by the Su-
preme Court to the intermediate appellate courts during the past
term. None of these involve any particularly important prin-
ciple, and since this subject will become almost moot after the
appellate reorganization goes into effect next July 1st, there is
no need to consider any of these specially."8
29. See Turley v. Dreyfus, 35 La.Ann. 510 (1883) ; Jones v. Jamison, 15
La.Ann. 35 (1860) ; Davis v. Dugas, 11 La.Ann. 118 (1856) ; Commercial Bank
of Natchez v. Markham, 3 La.Ann. 698 (1848) ; Kilgore v. Planters' Bank, 3
La.Ann. 693 (1848); Ward v. Agricultural Bank of Mississippi, 3 La.Ann. 450(1848) ; Scott v. Duke, 3 La.Ann. 253 (1848). Cf. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE arts.
746 and 747 (1870).
30. See the cases cited in the principal case.
31. 237 La. 929, 112 So.2d 664 (1959).
32. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2541 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1960) is declaratory of the jurisprudential rules for the enforcement
of a judgment of a court of another state or foreign country. Under the proposed
new code, a defendant would- make a general appearance which would subject him
to the jurisdiction of the court only when he seeks any relief therein, except that
mentioned in the code provision. Id. art. 7.
33. Four cases were transferred because the record did not show affirmatively
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Scott v. Blanton, 237 La. 926, 112 So.2d
663 (1959) ; Roseland Wirebound Box Co. v. Walker, 237 La. 292, 111 So.2d 118
(1959) ; Jackson v. Golson, 236 La. 735, 109 So.2d 75 (1959) ; and Succession
of Hopkins, 236 La. 469, 108 So.2d 92 (1959).
Four additional cases were transferred because the record showed affirmatively
that the Supreme Court did not have appellate jurisdiction. State ex rel. Stephens
v. Kees, 235 La. 999, 106 So.2d 447 (1958)-mandamus proceeding with no
1960]
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'A novel and interesting question of appellate procedure was
presented: in two of the cases decided during the past term. 4 In
both :a retail merchant had challenged the constitutionality and
validity of a sales tax imposed by the City of New Orleans on
merchandise sold within but delivered outside of the city, and
had appealed from an adverse judgment. The city and its di-
rector of finance moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
the appellant had no right to appeal, since the sales taxes were
paid by customers and not by the retailer, and hence the appel-
lant had no pecuniary interest in the controversy. The court held
that a party had a right to appeal from an adverse judgment,
and the issue of whether he had a pecuniary interest in the con-
troversy was immaterial insofar as his right to appeal was con-
cerned. It was pointed out that it was a person who was not a
party to the action who had to establish an interest in order to
appeal. The proposed new code will make no changes with re-
spect to either of these points.3 5
None of the other cases in this field decided during the past
term present any novel problem, and all were disposed of read-
ily through the application of settled rules of procedure. Yet
four of these cases focus attention on the technical nature of
some of our present rules, which in many instances serve more
to defeat than to further the ends of justice. In two of these
cases,36 the appeals (by the State of Louisiana incidentally)
were dismissed because the transcripts of appeal were filed after
the extended return day. In both, the appellant had obtained an
amount in dispute; Dwyer Lumber Co. v. Murphy Lumber and Supply Co., 237
La. 756, 112 So.2d 435 (1959)-less than $2,000 in dispute at the time the case
was submitted to the trial court for a decision; Succession of Crotty, 235 La.
1032, 106 So.2d 459 (1958)-less than $2,000 in the fund to be distributed; and
Thomas v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, 237 La. 257, 111 So.2d
105 (1959)-claim, inter alia, for damages for shock to the nervous system again
held to be a claim for damages for physical injury.
James v. Rapides Police Jury, 236 La. 493, 108 So.2d 100 (1959) was trans-
ferred on the ground that there was no amount in dispute therein. The appeal was
from a judgment which restrained the defendant from paying dues to a private
nonprofit corporation under a resolution previously adopted. The appellant sought
to sustain the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the contention that this
was an appeal from a judgment holding an ordinance of a parish unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court distinguished a legislative ordinance from an administrative
resolution, and swept the argument aside.
34. Krauss Company v. Develle, 235 La. 1013, 106 So.2d 452 (1958) ; Philip
Werlein, Ltd. v. Develle, 235 La. 1018, 106 So.2d 454 (1958).
35. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDUaE arts. 2082 and 2086 (Louisiana
State Law Institute, 1960).
° 36. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com'n, 236 La. 687,
109 So.2d 58 (1959) ; Texas & Pacific Railway v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com'n,
236 La. 695, 109 So.2d 61 (1959).
[Vol. XX
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extension of time to file the transcript which had not been com-
pleted by the original, return day, but neglected to :obtain a
further extension. Under the proposed new code: (1) it will be
the duty of the clerk of the trial court in all cases when the rec-
ord of appeal is not ready by the return day, to obtain the neces-
sary extension thereof from the trial court ;37 (2) in all cases
when the filing fee to be due the appellate court has been paid
to the clerk of the trial court, it will be his duty to file the rec-
ord of appeal in the appellate court;38 and (3) no appeal will be
dismissed because of any delay, neglect, or failure not imputable
to the appellant.39
In two cases, the motion to dismiss was based upon the fail-
ure of the appellant to pray for citation of appeal upon an ap-
pellee. In one, 40 the appeal was dismissed for this reason. In the
other,41 the appellant was more fortunate. The appellee moved
to dismiss the appeal on another ground, and mentioned the fail-
ure of the appellant to pray for citation of appeal only in his
brief. It was held that he had waived his objections to this de-
fect. Under the proposed new code, regardless of the type of
appeal and to what court, there will be no necessity for any cita-
tion of appeal. It will be the duty of the clerk of the trial court
to mail notice of the appeal to counsel of record for all other
parties, and his failure to do so will not be ground for the dismis-
sal of the appeal.42
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Attachment
A novel question was decided in South Street Lumber Co.. v.
Dickerson.43 There, the plaintiff sued the nonresident defend-
ants to recover a money judgment, and to confer jurisdiction
upon the trial court had obtained a writ of attachment, under
which certain immovable property alleged to belong to the de-
fendants was seized. Under a supplemental petition and writ,
37. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2125 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1960).
38. Id. art. 2127.
39. Id. art. 2161.
40. Townsend v. Graham, 236 La..499, 108 So.2d 103 (1959)..
41. Mongrue v. Lancaster, 235 La. 1002, 106 So.2d 448 (1958).
42. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDURE art. 2121 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1960). :
43. 235 La. 1062, 106 So.2d 513 (1958).
1960]
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additional immovable property alleged to belong to the defend-
ants was seized later. The defendants not having answered, an
attorney at law was appointed by the court to represent them,
and a default judgment was taken and confirmed contradictorily
against this attorney. In the meantime, Lake Charles Lumber
Co. filed a third opposition, and alleged that the writ was null
and void because the third opponent was the owner of the im-
movable property seized initially. After trial, judgment was ren-
dered for the third opponent, dissolving the attachment insofar
as the immovable property claimed by the third opponent was
concerned. Plaintiff appealed devolutively from this judgment,
and the third opponent moved to dismiss the appeal. The Su-
preme Court sustained this motion on the ground that, as a re-
sult of the failure of the plaintiff to appeal suspensively from
the judgment partially dissolving the attachment, the trial court
had lost its jurisdiction over the property claimed by the third
opponent. Since this case is the subject of a note in the Review,"
the reader is referred thereto for a discussion of the applicable
principles of law involved.
Injunction
Three of the four cases decided in this area during the past
term presented novel and interesting questions. United Mine
Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co.45 raised the question of
the extent of the liability of a plaintiff in a labor injunction suit
for the damages sustained by the defendant, when the injunctive
order had issued illegally.48 Plaintiff union sued to recover court
costs, premium on an appeal bond, reasonable attorney's fees,
travel and subsistence expenses of its attorneys, and a large
amount which it claimed resulted from its inability to collect the
dues of its members while the injunctive order was in effect.
The trial court maintained the defendant's exceptions of no right
and no cause of action, and rejected plaintiff's demands com-
pletely. On appeal, the Supreme Court partially reversed. The
amounts claimed by the plaintiff (except the last item mentioned
above) appeared to be recoverable under the express language
44. 19 LOUISIANA LAW Rzvjiw 897 (1959).
45. 238 La. 108, 113 So.2d 899 (1959).
46. In Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. United Mine Workers, 227 La. 1109, 81
So.2d 413 (1955), the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of the trial court
and the validity of the injunctive order which it had issued. This decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, under a writ of certiorari,
and it was there held that a state court had no jurisdiction to issue an injunctive
order under the facts of the case. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring
Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
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of Section 6 of the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act,47 but the total
amount claimed greatly exceeded the penal sum of the bond. The
statutory provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court as
providing the measure of damages when suit was filed on the
bond itself, but that when the defendant in injunction elected to
pursue his alternative remedy of a suit at law authorized by the
statute for an amount in excess of the bond, liability of the plain-
tiff in injunction was to be determined by the general law.
Plaintiff's cause of action was held limited to a recovery not in
excess of the penal sum of the bond.
The principles of law applied in two of these cases 48 are so
clear and well settled that these cases would hardly be worthy
of note, except for one little point made therein by the Supreme
Court. The plaintiffs' petition in these cases had prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a rule for a preliminary injunction,
and a final injunction. The defendants in each had filed a single
answer which the Supreme Court held sufficient as both an an-
swer to the rule for the preliminary injunction and to the plain-
tiffs' petition. Under the facts and circumstances of these cases,
and very probably under the language of these answers, the Su-
preme Court's position was well taken. But this language should
not be misconstrued into a holding that every answer to a rule
for a preliminary injunction is likewise an answer to the plain-
tiff's petition. These two pleadings have separate and distinct
functions; and while there is certainly no objection to both being
incorporated in the same document, it should be clear that both
are being pleaded therein.
In the opinion of the writer, the primary importance of New
Orleans v. Belas49 is due to its re-affirmation, by a unanimous
court, of the rule announced previously in New Orleans v. Lib-
erty Shop,5° by a divided court. The latter case recognized the
general rule that injunction does not lie to restrain the commis-
sion of a crime; but held that where the crime was also a nui-
sance, injunction would lie to abate the nuisance.
None of the Supreme Court's decisions on the subject of in-
junction procedure would be changed or affected in any way
through the adoption of the proposed new procedural code, which
47. LA. R.S. 23:844 (1950).
48. Warren v. De Armas, 236 La. 272, 107 So.2d 638 (1958) ; Gerica v. North,.
236 La. 278, 107 So.2d 640 (1958).
49. 235 La. 867, 106 So.2d 291 (1958).
50. 157 La. 26, 101 So. 798, 40 A.L.R. 1136 (1924).
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is, merely declaratory of the present injunction statute and the
interpretations placed thereon by the courts of Louisiana.5 1
HABEAS CORPUS
A single case produced both of the decisions of the Supreme
Court on this subject during the past term. In the first,52 it was
held that the action of the paternal grandparents, after service
of the writ upon them, in turning the child over to its father,
who subsequently took it with him into Mexico, was a prima
facie constructive contempt of court, punishable only after
service of a rule upon the contemnors. The advice of an attor-
ney to the father, after the institution of the habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, that the father had at least equal rights to the custody
of his child and hence could take him to Mexico, was held not: to
constitute a direct contempt, and as such punishable under the
present law. 53
In the second case, 54 the respondents did not produce the child
in the trial court in obedience to the writ, and merely filed a re-
turn generally denying all of the allegations of the petition. The
trial judge proceeded with the trial and rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff mother, ordering the respondents to deliver
possession of the child to the plaintiff forthwith. This was held
error by the Supreme Court, which ruled that the trial judge
should not have proceeded with the trial until the child was pro-
duced in open court in obedience to the writ, or a full and com-
plete explanation given for the inability of the respondents to so
produce him.
The proposed new code would make no changes in habeas
corpus procedure in civil cases, 55 and would make only a few
changes with respect to contempts of court. The latter are recog-
nized as being of two kinds: direct and constructive, and the acts
constituting each are specifically enumerated.5 6 The alleged ac-
tions of the grandparents and their attorney in these two cases,
if found to be true, would also be classified as constructive con-
51. See PRoposF- LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3601-3613 (Louisiana
State Law Institute, 1960).
52. State ex, rel. Collins v. Collins, 237 La. 111, 110 So.2d 545 (1959).
53. Under LA. R. S. 13:4612 (1950) an attorney may be punished only for a
direct contempt of court as defined therein.
54. State ex rel. Collins v. Collins, 237 La. 351, 111 So.2d 306. (1959).'
55. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3781-3785, and 3821-3831
(Louisiana State Law Institute, 1960)..
56. Id. arts. 221, 222, and 224..
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tempts under the new code.57 The court could punish a direct
contempt committed in its presence "forthwith, without any trial
other than affording [the contemnor] an opportunity to be heard
orally-by way of defense or mitigation."58 A constructive con-
tempt could be punished only after the trial of a rule served on
thelcontemnor at least forty-eight hours before, which rule must
state the facts alleged to constitute the contempt. 59 An attorney
would be subject to punishment for either a direct or construc-
tive~contempt 0
EXECUTORY PROCEEDINGS
In Mack Motor Truck Corp. v. Coco06 1 the plaintiff sought to
enforce two chattel mortgages on five motor trucks. sold to the
defendant. After proceedings not pertinent here, 2 the trucks
were offered at judicial sale by the sheriff separately, and .in
each instance the plaintiff was the highest bidder. The defend-
ant then demanded a further offering of all five trucks en globo,
and an adjudication to the highest bidder, if this bid exceeded
the total of plaintiff's five separate bids. This request was com-
plied with, and at the offering in bulk the defendant was the
highest bidder. The plaintiff then ruled the sheriff into the trial
court to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute acts
of sale to the plaintiff for the five trucks. After a trial thereof,
the rule was recalled on the ground that the procedure followed
by the sheriff in selling the trucks accorded with the local cus-
tom. The defendant and the sheriff then filed exceptions of no
right or cause of action to the petition for executory process,
based on the contention that plaintiff was without right to em-
ploy a single proceeding and a single writ to enforce its two
chattel mortgages against the five trucks. These exceptions were
maintained by the trial court, and the executory proceeding was
dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on both
points. In the absence of an order for the sale of the trucks en
globo, rendered on the application of a party and proof that such
57. Id. art. 224 (1, 2, 10).
58. Id. art. 223.
59. Id. art. 225.
60. Id. arts. 222, 224, 371.
61. 235 La. 1077, 106 So.2d 518 (1958).
62. The defendant first sought to enjoin the sale on the ground of certain
vices and defects in the trucks. The trial court found that such defects were
proved, but refused to enjoin the sale on this ground, allowing only a reduction
in the amount claimed by the plaintiff. This judgment was reversed on appeal on
the ground that the defendant had failed to prove the amount of the damages
allegedly sustained by him, and the injunction proceeding was dismissed as, of
nonsuit. Coco v. Mack Motor Truck Corp., 235 La. 1095, 106 So.2d 691 (1958).
1960]:
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
a sale would be in the best interests of the applicant, the Su-
preme Court held that there was no authority for the procedure
followed by the sheriff in selling the trucks. On the second point,
the court pointed out that defenses and objections to an execu-
tory proceeding may be raised only in an injunction proceeding
to arrest the seizure and sale, or by a suspensive appeal." The
proposed new code is declaratory of the rule of executory pro-
cedure applied by the Supreme Court here, 64 but will make a
change in the law with respect to a judicial sale under execu-
tionA. 5
The jurisprudence is neither clear nor consistent on the ques-
tion of whether attorney's fees are allowed as an element of
damages for an illegal seizure. In Hernandez v. Harson," where
the court found that the seizing creditor acted in good faith and
without malice, it refused to allow attorney's fees to the third
opponent who had successfully arrested the seizure and sale of
an automobile on the ground that it was the property of the third
opponent and not of the defendant in the executory proceeding.
The cases on all facets of this subject are analyzed and discussed
in a recent comment in the Review,6 7 to which the reader is re-
referred.
PARTITION BETWEEN CO-OWNERS
Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Strange s focuses attention on
both the inadequacy and the unfairness of our present statutes
relating to the partition of property in which a nonresident has
an interest. Proceeding under R.S. 9:171 et seq. the plaintiff
sought in the trial court to provoke a partition by private sale
of a large tract of timber land in which the nonresident defend-
ant owned an undivided 1/32 interest. The defendant appeared
through counsel and opposed the proceeding on the ground that
63. Theoretically, the defendant in an executory proceeding may raise objec-
tions patent on the face of the record through a devolutive appeal. But this is
a hollow remedy, since the seized property is usually sold pending the appeal, and
the latter is then dismissed on the ground that it presents only a moot question.
Bank of La Fourche v. Barrios, 167 La. 215, 118 So. 893 (1928). For this reason,
the Law Institute is recommending elimination of the devolutive appeal in execu-
tory proceedings.
64. PROPOSED LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDuRE art. 2642 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1960).
65. Id. art. 2295: "When property is offered by items or portions and the total
price bid is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, with interest and costs, or if the
judgment debtor so requests, the property shall be offered in globo and thus sold
if a higher bid is obtained."
66. 237 La. 389, 111 So.2d 320 (1958).
67. 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 389 (1960).
68. 236 La. 77, 106 So.2d 723 (1958).
[Vol XX
CIVIL PROCEDURE
she was not an absentee within the intendment of the statute.
The trial: court ordered the private sale of the property at the
fair value established by the evidence. The intermediate appel-
late court affirmed.69 Under a writ of review, the Supreme Court
originally affirmed the judgment. On rehearing, however, the
court-reversed the judgment of both courts below, and dismissed
the proceeding. It was held that since the defendant had ap-
peared, she was no longer an absentee within the intendment of
the statute invoked.
Largely because of this case, the Law Institute is recommend-
ing changes in the statutory law on the partition of property in
which an absentee has an interest. The proposed new code 70
will in, effect amalgamate the two present statutes on the sub-
ject;71 but since the private sale of such property was deemed
unfair and prejudicial of the interest of the absent owner in
most instances, only a public sale will be authorized.72 If the
property is divisible in kind, and the absentee timely answers
through counsel of his own selection and prays therefor, the
court would order the partition to be made in kind.73
A settled rule of law was applied to new circumstances in
Nides v. Hoyle.74 There, a divorced wife sought an accounting
of the community property by her husband and the partition by
licitation of the single piece of immovable property owned in
common. The trial court rendered judgment decreeing the par-
tition and ordering the accounting, but directed that the sale of
the property be stayed pending the accounting. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed. It was held that when judgment is ren-
dered decreeing a partition by licitation, the property must be
sold immediately, and the proceeds held subject to the further
orders of the court. The proposed new code would make no
change in this rule.7 5
NULLITY OF COMPROMISE
Only one question of law was decided in Blades v. Southern
69. Roy 0. Martin Lumber Co. v. Strange, 95 So.2d 853 (La. App. 1957).
70. PRoPosED LA. CODE OF CivIi. PROcEuRE arts. 4621-1630 (Louisiana State
Law Institute, 1960). Article 5251(1) contains a broad and specific definition of
"absentee" for all procedural purposes.
71. LA. R.S. 9:171 et seq. (1950) authorizes the private sale of such prop-
erty, while LA. R.S. 13:4976 et seq. (1950) authorizes the public sale thereof.
72. PBOPoSD LA. CODE OF CxvIL PnocuRx art. 4621 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1960).
73. Id. art. 4630.
74. 236 La. 1032, 109 So.2d 908 (1959).
75. PRoposED LA. CODE OF CrvIL PaocEDuaE art. 4607 (Louisiana State Law
Institute, 1960).
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Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co.,76 but that was both novel and
important. The Supreme Court there held that a father, acting
as the administrator of the estate of his minor child, could exe-
cute a valid compromise of the minor's claim for physical injury
without first obtaining authority from a court of competent
jurisdiction. Admittedly, a tutor would have to obtain judicial
authority for such a compromise.7 7 The soundness of the Su-
preme Court's decision hinges upon the construction to be placed
on the italicized language of the following excerpt from the per-
tinent code article:
"Property belonging to minors, both of whose parents are
living, may be sold or mortgaged, and any other step may be
taken affecting their interests, in the same manner and by
pursuing the same forms as in the case of minors represented
by tutors, the father occupying the place and being clothed
with the powers of the tutor. ' 78
In reliance upon the established jurisprudence, the court held
that judicial authority for the act of the administrator of the
estate of a minor is necessary only when property of the minor
is to be alienated or encumbered, or some action is to be taken
with respect to his property beyond the mere administration
thereof. The court further held that the prosecution and settle-
ment of a claim for personal injuries does not fall within this
category. The writer doubts the soundness of the court's deci-
sion. He admits that the prosecution of a claim for physical
injuries, as well as the receipt of the full amount of a judgment
in favor of the minor, is a matter of administration. But the
writer believes that the compromise of such a claim is a species
of alienation of a right of the minor which should require ju-
dicial authorization.
76. 237 La. 1, 110 So.2d 116 (1959).
77. Under LA. CIvL CODE art. 353 (1870).
78. Id. art. 222. PRoPosED L.. CODE OF CrvxL PRoCEDuRE art. 4501 (Louisiana
State Law Institute, 1960) retains substantially the language of the Civil Code
provision.
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